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ATTORNEYS-Professional Responsibility-Restrictive Cove-
nants-Attorneys Must Not Enter Into Partnership Agreements
Prohibiting Themselves -from Representing Former Clients
Upon Termination of the Partnership. Dwyer v. Jung, 133 N.J.
Super. 343, 336 A.2d 498 (Ch. 1975), appeal docketed, No. 3378-74,
App. Div., June 18, 1975.
Three attorneys entered into a partnership agreement for the
practice of law.' Their agreement included a provision that assigned
the partnership's insurance carrier clients to individual partners
upon the termination of the partnership and restricted the partners
from doing business with a client designated as that of another
partner for a period of five years.' Of these insurance carrier clients,
154 were assigned to the defendant while five were allotted to the
plaintiffs.3
After the partnership was dissolved, the plaintiffs sought a judi-
cial accounting.4 The defendant counterclaimed, contending that
the plaintiffs violated the restrictive covenant of the original part-
nership agreement by attempting to do business with clients desig-
nated as his.5 Plaintiffs denied the charge and argued that the cove-
nant apportioning clients to individual partners had the effect of
prohibiting the other partners from dealing with those clients and
was therefore void as against public policy.' The plaintiffs also con-
tended that they had entered into the agreement at the insistence
of the defendant, even though all parties regarded the provision as
unenforceable .'
The Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, held that
the covenant in the partnership agreement restricted the partner-
ship's clients in their choice of counsel and was thus void for public
1. Dwyer v. Jung, 133 N.J. Super. 343, 345, 336 A.2d 498, 499 (Ch. 1975), appeal docketed,
No. 3378-74, App. Div., June 18, 1975.
2. Id. at 345, 336 A.2d at 499. The agreement provided that each partner would contribute
a stated amount for capital, cooperate in the business of the partnership, share in the partner-
ship net profits and be entitled to a repayment of capital and a distributive share of the profits
and assets upon dissolution. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 345-46, 336 A.2d at 499. Partners have a right to an accounting after the dissolu-
tion of the partnership. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 42:1-43 (1940).
5. 133 N.J. Super. at 346, 336 A.2d at 499.
6. Id.
7. Id.
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policy reasons.' The court refused to apply the standards usually
used in evaluating restrictive covenants?
Restrictive covenants are generally appurtenant'" to either con-
tracts involving employment or those involving the sale of business.
In employment contracts, the covenants are used to prevent an
employee from competing with his employer after his term of em-
ployment expires." As early as the Middle Ages,"2 masters used
these covenants in their contracts with apprentices to prolong their
apprentices' periods of servitude, impede their entry into the guilds
and thus limit competition.'" Early English courts struck down such
covenants, finding them to be a restriction of economic freedom and
violative of guild customs. 4
The advent of the Industrial Revolution and greater mechaniza-
tion resulted in more specialization and a pronounced need for busi-
nessmen to provide workers with special training.'5 As a result, busi-
nessmen found an increasing need for restrictive covenants to dis-
courage such employees from leaving and to prevent business se-
crets from being given to competitors by ex-employees.'5 With the
changing economic system, 18th century courts began to accept
these restrictive covenants as being necessary to protect business-
men.
17
The Queens Bench in the celebrated case of Mitchel v. Reynolds"
8. Id. at 346-47, 336 A.2d at 500.
9. Id. Those standards are delineated in Solari Indus., Inc. v. Malady, 55 N.J. 571, 576,
264 A.2d 53, 58 (1971). The Dwyer court aslo relied on ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSI-
BILITY D.R. 2-108(A) in reaching its holding. 133 N.J. Super. at 347, 336 A.2d at 500.
10. Restrictive covenants must be ancillary to legal contracts. A restrictive covenant
cannot stand by itself. See, e.g., Irving Inv. Corp. v. Gordon, 3 N.J. 217, 69 A.2d 725 (1949).
The covenant must also be made for a consideration. See, e.g., Cleaver v. Lenhart, 182 Pa.
285, 37 A. 811 (1897).
11. Restrictive covenants limiting an employee from accepting other employment while
working for his current employer have always been legal. 54 AM. Jua. 2d Monopolies, Re-
straint of Trade and Unfair Trade Practices § 513 (1971).
12. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 625, 632 (1960)
[hereinafter cited as Blake.]
13. Id. at 632-34.
14. For the first reported case of a restrictive covenant being held illegal, see Dyer's Case,
Y.B. Mich. 2 Hen. 5, f. 5, pl. 26 (C.P. 1414).
15. Blake 638.
16. Id.
17. There were several 17th century cases in which covenants ancillary to a contract
involving the sale of a business were upheld. See, e.g. Rogers v. Parrey, 80 Eng. Rep. 1012
(K.B. 1613).
18. 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (Q.B. 1711).
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held that restrictive covenants attempting to discourage employees
from terminating their employment and competing with their ex-
employers were presumptively illegal.'9 However, the court classi-
fied such covenants as either "limited" or "general" and said that
"limited" covenants which restricted a covenantee from accepting
employment in a limited area could be legal."0 Hence, the decision
in Mitchel gave rise to the "reasonableness" test to determine the
legality of restrictive covenants." That test is still followed by most
courts in England and the United States." Restrictive covenants
that are not limited to a reasonable period of time and a reasonable
area or scope of activity are still unenforceable, while those cove-
nants that are so limited may be enforced."
In New Jersey, as in many other jurisdictions," a restrictive cove-
nant is reasonable if it "protects the legitimate interest of the em-
ployer, imposes no undue hardship on the employee and is not inju-
rious to the public." 5 However, when a covenant restricts an em-
19. Id. at 348-49.
20. Id. at 347, 349, 352. In Mitchel, as in many of its predecessors, a restrictive covenant
ancillary to a sale of business was upheld. The court was well ahead of its time when it
indicated that it would consider upholding a restrictive covenant incidental to an employ-
ment contract. Blake 630-31.
21. Blake 639.
22. Id. at 643-44. The Supreme Court adopted the Mitchel reasoning in Oregon Steam
Navigation Co. v. Winsor, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 64 (1873).
23. Blake 643. The Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970), which declares illegal "every
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations .... " has rarely been used to
find such restrictive covenants illegal, although the legislative history and subsequent judicial
discussion seem to indicate that the Sherman Act was intended to prohibit those restraints
unenforceable at the common law. Blake 628. A similar provision in the New Jersey antitrust
law, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:9-3 (Supp. 1975), has been cited as a standard for judging the
legality of restrictive covenants. See Whitmyer v. Doyle, 58 N.J. 25, 274 A.2d 577 (1971)
(restrictive covenant found to be reasonable). The New Jersey antitrust law has yet to be used
to strike down any employment restrictive covenants.
Oklahoma has an antitrust statute similar to that of New Jersey that has been interpreted
to prohibit all restrictive covenants. OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, § 217 (1966); E.S. Miller Labs, Inc.
v. Griffin, 200 Okla. 398, 194 P.2d 877 (1948). Other states prohibit some restrictive cove-
nants. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (1964); N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-08-06 (1975).
24. See, e.g., McMurray v. Bateman, 221 Ga. 240, 144 S.E.2d 345 (1965); Marshall v.
Covington, 81 Idaho 199, 339 P.2d 504 (1959); Solari Indus., Inc. v. Malady, 55 N.J. 571, 264
A.2d 53 (1971); Hayes v. Altman, 424 Pa. 23, 225 A.2d 670 (1967).
25. Solari Indus., Inc. v. Malady, 55 N.J. 571, 576, 264 A.2d 53, 56 (1971). In determining
reasonableness, courts today generally balance the employer's need to protect himself from
competition with the employee's need to have free economic mobility and with the potential
injury inflicted upon the public by the covenant. Earlier courts weighed each of the three
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ployee from taking employment over a larger scope of economic
activity"6 or geographic area 7 or for an unlimited or longer period of
time 8 than necessary to protect the employer, it is considered over-
broad and unenforceable.
With respect to restrictive covenants appurtenant to contracts for
the purchase of businesses, vendees frequently insist upon clauses
prohibiting the vendor from competing with the vendee for a speci-
fied period of time in a specific area after the vendee purchases the
business.2" These covenants are designed to protect the good will of
the business for the benefit of the buyer."0
Courts are generally more reluctant to enforce covenants appur-
tenant to employment contracts than covenants incidental to con-
tracts involving the sale of a business3' for several reasons. First,
contracts involving the sale of a business are generally between
parties of approximately equal bargaining power. Employment con-
tracts, on the other hand, are usually made between parties of une-
qual bargaining power, often forcing the employee to accept such
elements against an extrinsic standard to determine "reasonableness." The test stated in the
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §§ 513-15 (1932), and followed by some courts, simply considers
whether the restrictions are no greater than required for the protection of the employer and
does not examine the legitimacy of the employer's interest. Blake 649-50.
26. In Little Rock Towel & Linen Supply Co. v. Independent Linen Serv. Co., 237 Ark.
877, 377 S.W.2d 34 (1964), the court held unreasonable a covenant which prohibited a linen
service manager from managing either a laundry or a linen service after the termination of
his employment because the manager had never been in the laundry business.
27. In Wyder v. Milhomme, 96 N.J.L. 500, 115 A. 380 (Ct. Err. & App. 1921), the court
ruled that a covenant involving a silk-finisher that restricted the employee from accepting
employment anywhere in the United States was unreasonable because the company's busi-
ness took place almost exclusively in the New York metropolitan area. The court, in Allright
Auto Parks, Inc. v. Berry, 219 Tenn. 280, 409 S.W.2d 361 (1966), held unreasonable a cove-
nant banning an ex-employee from working in 46 cities because the employee had worked in
only three of the 46 cities and consequently would only be able to competently compete with
his ex-employer in those three cities.
28. Mandeville v. Harman, 42 N.J. Eq. 185, 7 A. 37 (Ch. 1886) and Schneller v. Hayes,
176 Wash. 115, 28 P.2d 273 (1934) rejected covenants that were restrictive for an unlimited
time. See also Wyder v. Milhomme, 96 N.J.L. 500, 115 A. 380 (Ct. Err. & App. 1921) (restric-
tive covenant for ten years unreasonable). But see Heuer v. Rubin, 1 N.J. 251, 62 A.2d 812
(1949) (covenant restricting covenantee from working for unlimited time in Rahway, N.J.
reasonable).
29. Blake 646-47.
30. Dwyer v. Jung, 133 N.J. 343, 346, 336 A.2d 498, 499 (Ch. 1975). See also Blake 646-
48.
31. See, e.g., Magic Fingers, Inc. v. Robins, 86 N.J. Super. 236, 206 A.2d 601 (Ch. 1965).
For a detailed discussion of the matter, see Kadis v. Britt, 224 N.C. 154, 29 S.E.2d 543 (1944)
and Blake 646-48.
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covenants on a "take-it-or-leave-it" basis.32 Second, such covenants
compel employees to remain in businesses that they can not easily
leave and restrict their economic freedom by preventing them from
fully choosing their business activities and the location of such ac-
tivities.33 This fact has the additional effect of preventing consumers
who desire a particular employee's services from being able to ob-
tain them. 4 Last, the need for such covenants is usually far greater
for a purchaser of a business than it is for an employer.35 A vendee
would not receive the full value of his business if his predecessor
could compete with him and retain his old customers, 6 while an
employer, in most instances, could still receive the full value of his
contract with the employee without such an agreement.37
As a rule, courts have enforced restrictive covenants against em-
ployees entrusted with knowledge of the employer's business meth-
ods that would be harmful to the employer if learned by a competi-
tor.3" Courts have also enforced covenants when the employee had
enjoyed close dealings with the employer's customers and could lure
those customers from the employer if he entered into competition
with the employer. 9
32. Blake 647-48. Perhaps treatment of partnership agreements as employment contracts
with respect to restrictive covenants is inappropriate. Partnerships are generally formed
between parties of equal bargaining strength while employment contracts are usually formed
between an employer and a potential employee, parties of unequal bargaining power. See
ABA COMM. ON PaOFESSIONAL ETHICS, INFORMAL DECISIONS, No. 521 (1962).
33. Blake 647-48.
34. Id. It also weakens the employees' bargaining power while working for the employer
and impedes the communication of ideas. Id.
35. Dwyer v. Jung, 133 N.J. Super. 343, 346, 336 A.2d 498, 499 (Ch. 1975).
36. Blake 647-48.
37. Id.
38. See, e.g., Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Murrell, 212 Ark. 449, 206 S.W.2d 185 (1947);
Donahoe v. Tatum, 242 Miss. 253, 134 So.2d 442 (1961); Irvington Varnish & Insulator Co.
v. Van Norde, 138 N.J. Eq. 99, 46 A.2d 201 (Ct. Err. & App. 1946); 0. Hommel Co. v. Fink,
115 W. Va. 686, 177 S.E. 619 (1934).
39. See, e. g., Stokes v. Moore, 262 Ala. 59, 77 So.2d 331 (1955); Willis v. Dictograph Sales
Corp., 222 Ind. 523, 54 N.E.2d 774 (1944); Silbros, Inc. v. Solomon, 139 N.J. Eq. 528, 52 A.2d
534 (Ch. 1947); Plunkett Chemical Co. v. Reeve, 373 Pa. 513, 95 A.2d 925 (1953).
New York courts will also enforce restrictive covenants when the employer can show that
the employee's services are "special, unique or extraordinary." Purchasing Associates, Inc.
v. Weitz, 13 N.Y.2d 267, 272, 196 N.E.2d 245, 248, 246 N.Y.S.2d 600, 602 (1963). In this
case the New York Court of Appeals looked behind the sale of business language to find an
employment contract and then applied the stricter employment contract test to invalidate
the restrictive covenant and reverse the court below. Thus an inference arises that the stricter
test applied to employment contracts requires a greater showing of irreparable harm to obtain
injunctive relief than does the test for sale of business covenants.
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Restrictive covenants ancillary to employment contracts can be
found in both contracts between businessmen and contracts be-
tween professionals,4' and most jurisdictions, including New Jersey,
use the same criteria regardless of which type they are evaluating."
There has been only one prior reported United States case dealing
with the reasonableness of a restrictive covenant involving attor-
neys.42 In Hicklin v. O'Brien,43 Illinois' highest court used the cus-
tomary reasonableness test to enforce a covenant ancillary to a con-
tract involving the sale of a law practice that forbade the vendor
from practicing law within the county of the practice.44 The Hicklin
court reasoned that the restriction did not impose an unreasonable
hardship upon the vendor since he could still practice anywhere but
in that county.45 Unlike Dwyer, Hicklin involved the sale of a law
practice and was thus decided according to the less stringent reason-
ableness standard normally applied to business sales contracts. The
restrictive covenant in Dwyer was incidental to a partnership agree-
ment," a form of employment contract.
Since the Hicklin decision in 1956, the American Bar Association
(ABA) Committee on Professional Ethics has several times dealt
with the question of whether restrictive covenants incidental to at-
torney employment contracts are ethical. In Formal Opinion 300,11
40. See, e.g., Marvel v. Jonah, 83 N.J. Eq. 295, 90 A. 1004 (Ct. Err. & App. 1914) (profes-
sionals); Sonotone Corp. v. Baldwin, 227 N.C. 387, 42 S.E.2d 352 (1974) (businessmen);
Hayes v. Altman, 424 Pa. 23, 225 A.2d 670 (1967) (professionals).
41. Compare Weiss v. Levine, 134 N.J. Eq. 1, 34 A.2d 237 (Ch. 1943)(covenant between
orthodontists) and Hayes v. Altman, 424 Pa. 23, 225 A.2d 670 (1967)(covenant involving
optometrist) with A. Fink & Sons v. Goldberg, 101 N.J. Eq. 644, 139 A. 408 (Ch. 1927)
(covenant between truck owner and routeman) and Plunkett Chemical Co. v. Reeve, 373 Pa.
513, 95 A.2d 925 (1953)(covenant involving salesman). See generally Dodd, Contracts Not to
Practice Medicine, 23 B. U. L. REv. 305 (1943). For the criteria used in determining reasona-
bleness, see notes 25-27 supra and accompanying text.
42. Hicklin v. O'Brien, 11111. App. 2d 541, 138 N.E.2d 47 (1956). In contrast, in England
many restrictive covenants between lawyers have been brought to court and all but one have
been found to be reasonable and legal. The one covenant found illegal was held so because it
restricted the attorney for an unlimited period of time and not because it was entered into
by lawyers. See Blake 662 n.122.
In one case involving a non-lawyer employee of a law firm, the usual reasonableness stan-
dard was used by the court. Toulmin v. Becker, 69 Ohio L. Abs. 109, 124 N.E.2d 778 (Ct.
App. 1954).
43. 11111. App. 2d 541, 138 N.E.2d 47 (1956).
44. Id. at 542-44, 138 N.E.2d at 48-49.
45. Id. at 547-50, 138 N.E.2d at 50-52.
46. 133 N.J. Super. at 345, 336 A.2d at 499.
47. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHics, FORMAL OPINIONS, No. 300 (1961).
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the Committee found unethical a law firm's employment contract
with a prospective attorney which restricted the attorney's right to
practice in the city and county where the firm was located for a
period of two years after he left the firm.4" The committee relied
largely upon Original Canon 27, which stated that the division of
the client market can only be achieved by "the establishment of a
well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to
trust,"4 and Original Canon 7 which forbade an attorney from in
any way encroaching on the business of another lawyer.50
Informal Decision 5211I extended the holding of Formal Opinion
300 to restrictions against an employee handling the legal work of
any established client of the firm after the employee terminated his
employment." However, the committee in dictum said that Opinion
300 applied to employment agreements but not to partnership
agreements since parties to the latter were of equal bargaining
power. 3
In 1969, the ABA Committee on the Evaluation of Ethical Stan-
dards rewrote the ABA canons and added to them new mandatory
disciplinary rules.54 Disciplinary Rule 2-108(A) of the Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility deals specifically with the ethicality of re-
strictive covenants incidental to employment and partnership
agreements, stating: 5
48. Id.
49. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 27 (1908). See also ABA COMM. ON PROFES-
SIONAL ETHmICS, INFORMAL OPINIONS, No. 910 (1966) (associate of law firm allowed to inform
his clients of changed status).
50. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 7 (1908).
51. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, INFORMAL DECISIONS, No. 521 (1962). An informal
decision differs from a formal opinion in that it is concerned with a narrow area of ethics while
a formal opinion deals with more general questions of ethics. The sources for informal deci-
sions are generally questions sent by members of the ABA to the Committee on Professional
Ethics. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, OPINIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 6
(1967).
52. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, INFORMAL DECISIONS, No. 521 (1962).
53. Id.
54. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY was adopted by the ABA on August 12,
1969 and became effective January 1, 1970.
55. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIaILITY D.R. 2-108(A). Disciplinary rules differ
from canons and ethical considerations in that disciplinary rules are mandatory minimum
standards that all attorneys must meet. Canons and ethical considerations are simply goals
to which attorneys should aspire. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Preliminary
Statement.
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A lawyer should not be a party to or participate in a partnership or employ-
ment agreement with another lawyer that restricts the right of a lawyer to
practice law after the termination of a relationship created by the agreement
The new disciplinary rule differs from previous opinions in that
it treats partnership and employment agreements alike in determin-
ing the ethicality of a lawyer restrictive covenant.56 Both the New
Jersey Supreme Court's Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics
and the New York County Lawyer's Association Committee on Pro-
fessional Ethics have used Disciplinary Rule 2-108(A) to find re-
strictive covenants incidental to partnership agreements unethi-
cal. 7 This rule and its attendant considerations were the basis of the
Dwyer court's decision to refuse to apply common law commercial
standards to attorney restrictive covenants, and thus to invalidate
all such covenants." Furthermore, in doing so, Dwyer departed from
the common law to create a new category of restrictive covenants
labeled "lawyer restrictive covenants.""
Dwyer distinguished this new category of covenants from those
incidental to a sale of a business'" by reasoning that a lawyer's
clients are not property that can be offered for sale." The court did
not attempt to distinguish restrictive covenants appurtenant to
employment contracts from lawyer restrictive covenants, but only
noted that they were often upheld as legitimate devices to protect
the business and good will of employers against unfair competi-
tion.6"
In concluding that these lawyer restrictive covenants should be
judged by "ethical" rather than "commercial" standards, 3 the
56. See text accompanying note 53 supra. It would seem that the earlier and more accur-
ate observation as to bargaining strength was overlooked when the new ABA CODE OF PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY was drawn up.
57. N.J. SUP. CT. LAW. ADVISORY COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 147
(1969); N.Y. Co. LAW. Ass'N COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, QUESTIONS, No. 621 (1974). Both
the New York County and New Jersey committees are simply advisory committees that deal
solely with inquiries from attorneys.
58. 133 N.J. Super. at 347-49, 336 A.2d at 500-01.
59. Id. at 346-47, 336 A.2d at 499-500.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 346, 336 A.2d at 499. The Dwyer court relied upon the logic of H. DRINKER, LEGAL
ETHICS 161, 189 (1965) for this conclusion.
62. 133 N.J. Super. at 346, 336 A.2d at 499.
63. Id. at 348-49, 336 A.2d at 500-01. Dwyer's criticism of Hicklin v. O'Brien, 11111. App.
2d 541, 138 N.E.2d 47 (1956) was perhaps unfair. The court in Dwyer said that Hicklin
[Vol. IV
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Dwyer court reasoned that the consensual and, on the part of the
attorney, highly fiduciary nature of the attorney-client relationship
entitled clients to be represented by the counsel of their own choos-
ing 4 and held that any attempt on the part of the attorneys to
restrict that right would be illegal. 5 Division of the client market,
according to Dwyer, is to be accomplished through individual per-
formance rather than through active competition." In reaching this
conclusion, the court followed the lead 7 of the New Jersey Supreme
Court's Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics and the New
York County Lawyer's Association Committee on Professional Eth-
ics6" by interpreting the Disciplinary Rule 2-108(A) phrase "A law-
yer should not be a party to or participate in a partnership. . . that
restricts the right of a lawyer to practice law after the termination
of a relationship"69 as prohibiting attorneys from including restric-
tive covenants in their own partnership agreements. °
"completely ignored the effect the covenant might have upon potential clients ... and failed
to respect the underlying ethical considerations affecting the practice of law." 133 N.J. Super.
at 349, 336 A.2d at 501. However, the court in Hicklin said that "Ithe record, in the instant
case, fails to disclose that there would be any hardship to the public" and considered but
dismissed the ethical and public policy questions reasoning that public policy is a matter of
the state constitution, statutes, and decisions of the courts and that there was no public policy
contrary to its holding. 11111. App. 2d at 550, 138 N.E.2d at 52.
64. 133 N.J. Super. at 347, 336 A.2d at 500.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 347-48, 336 A.2d at 500. For this conclusion, Dwyer relied upon N.J. SuP. CT.
LAW. ADVISORY COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 147 (1969).
67. 133 N.J. Super. at 347-48, 336 A.2d at 500-01. The Dwyer court did not distinguish
the cases before the New York County and New Jersey committees on professional ethics.
These cases dealt with covenants that became effective upon the withdrawal of a partner
rather than upon the termination of an agreement. As a partnership can be terminated by a
willful breach of the partnership contract as well as by the withdrawal of a partner, one might
think that courts would less readily enforce a covenant that would take effect upon the
termination of a partnership in order to prevent the possibility of a willfully breaching partner
reaping the benefits of a covenant. New Jersey courts have yet to address this issue.
68. N.J. SUP. CT. LAW. ADVISORY COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 147
(1969); N.Y. Co. LAW. Ass'N COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, QUESTIONS, No. 621 (1974).
69. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY D.R. 2-108(A).
70. 133 N.J. Super. at 347, 336 A.2d at 500; ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
D.R. 2-108(A). D.R. 2-108(A) does not have to be interpreted as forbidding all lawyer restric-
tive covenants. It could also be interpreted narrowly as forbidding only covenants that pre-
vent a lawyer from exercising his right to practice law. The partners in Dwyer still have the
right to practice law and to represent any clients except those limited by the covenant. The
ABA has not yet interpreted this rule as forbidding all lawyer restrictive covenants. The last
ABA decision on the subject, ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, INFORMAL DECISIONS, No.
521, permitted lawyer restrictive covenants ancillary to partnership agreements.
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Dwyer's treatment of lawyer restrictive covenants is different
from the treatment of other restrictive covenants by any previous
court. In creating the new category of "lawyer restrictive cove-
nants," Dwyer, unlike other decisions, emphasized the principle
that clients are not and should not be treated as chattel.7' However,
the Dwyer court did not discuss the rationale for its distinction of
lawyer restrictive covenants from other covenants on this ground
nor explain why the clients of other professionals or businessmen
could be more readily considered property than clients of an attor-
ney. Furthermore, in creating the new category and relying upon
Disciplinary Rule 2-108(A), Dwyer declined to distinguish between
lawyer restrictive covenants ancillary to an employment contract
and lawyer restrictive covenants incidental to a partnership agree-
ment." While common law courts often consider the relative bar-
gaining strengths of the parties in determining the legality of a
covenant, 3 there is no discussion in Dwyer as to the parties' bar-
gaining strengths.74
Dwyer's adoption of the "ethicality" test and reliance upon Disci-
plinary Rule 2-108(A) for judging the legality of lawyer restrictive
covenants is both unique and questionable. Dwyer reasoned that a
prohibition of lawyer restrictive covenants would result in the pro-
per division of the client market on the basis of individual perform-
ance. 5 Proper division would be impossible if competent lawyers
could bind clients to incompetent lawyers or prohibit themselves
from dealing with those clients. On the other hand, at least one
71. 133 N.J. Super. at 346, 336 A.2d at 499.
72. Id. at 347, 336 A.2d at 500.
73. Blake 647-48; see McCallum v. Asbury, 238 Ore. 257, 263, 393 P.2d 774, 776-77 (1964)
(an unusually harsh covenant ancillary to a doctors' partnership agreement enforced). Here,
the court took note of the fact that the doctor who agreed to the covenant employed a lawyer
to help make his decision and accepted the covenant for the great benefits that he would gain
from the partnership. Id. See also Cogley Clinic v. Martini, 253 Iowa 541, 112 N.W.2d 678
(1962).
74. There are also no indications that the Dwyer court considered whether the covenant
was arrived at after negotiations between the parties or whether one partner forced the other
partner into entering the partnership or agreeing to the covenant. Obviously, the Dwyer court
determined that the possible injurious effect of a lawyer restrictive covenant on the client
market outweighed the lawyer's interest in making such a covenant. In making this calcula-
tion, the Dwyer court, rejecting the use of the "reasonableness" test in judging lawyer
restrictive covenants, has, paradoxically, used a weighing process typical of that used by a
court applying a "reasonableness" test to a restrictive covenant.
75. 133 N.J. Super. at 347-48, 336 A.2d at 500.
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authority believes that the division of the client market is no longer
achieved by individual performance."6 Disciplinary Rule 2-108(A)
also does not assure clients of good representation or even assure
clients that the lawyers of their choosing will take their cases. Fur-
thermore, the ABA Disciplinary Rules forbid the advertising of serv-
ices by lawyers." These advertising prohibitions could likewise be
construed as restricting attorneys in their practice and denying
clients the broadest possible opportunity to select the lawyer of their
choice."7
The "ethicality" test adopted by the Dwyer court to judge lawyer
restrictive covenants differs from the standard used to judge restric-
tive covenants among other professionals." New Jersey and most
other jurisdictions have used the "reasonableness" test rather than
the "ethicality" test in judging restrictive covenants of doctors, 0
engineers,"' and other professionals.82 The Dwyer court justified its
76. E.g., "Perhaps the system of establishing a legal reputation by performance still works
in the national commercial-financial and industrial community-which in its totality today
is small enough that it might well be compared to the frontier city which was the model for
our present practices on lawyer selection by clients. Certainly it does not work that way for
the mass of population anymore-even if it once did-because individuals in the mass of
megalopolis no longer know about sole practitioners-or small law firms-or even large law
firms. Most individual members of the general public would-I believe-suppose today that
one lawyer could help him or her as well as another." Address by Chesterfield Smith, former
president of the ABA, Fordham Law School Alumni Association, Mar. 1, 1975.
77. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY D.R. 2-101(A) prohibits the solicitation of
clients and advertising by lawyers.
78. Address by Chesterfield Smith, former president of the ABA, Fordham Law School
Alumni Association, Mar. 1, 1975. There appears to be a conflict between ABA CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY D.R. 2-101(A), which prohibits lawyers from advertising and
advising potential clients of their services, and ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
D.R. 2-108(A), which, according to Dwyer, is aimed at helping the client select the attorney
of his own choosing.
79. Compare Dwyer v. Jung, 133 N.J. Super. 343, 336 A.2d 498 (Ch. 1975) with Marvel
v. Jonah, 83 N.J. Eq. 295, 90 A. 1004 (Ct. Err. & App. 1914).
80. See, e.g., Mabray v. Williams, 132 Colo. 523, 291 P.2d 677 (1955); McMurray v.
Bateman, 221 Ga. 240, 144 S.E.2d 345 (1965); Marshall v. Covington, 81 Idaho 199, 339 P.2d
504 (1959); Marvel v. Jonah, 83 N.J. Eq. 295, 90 A. 1004 (Ct. Err. & App. 1914).
81. Hulsenbusch v. Davidson Rubber Co., 344 F.2d 730 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 977 (1966); Zeff, Farrington & Associates, Inc. v. Farrington, 168 Colo. 48, 449 P.2d 813
(1969); Irvington Varnish & Insulator Co. v. Van Norde, 138 N.J. Eq. 99, 46 A.2d 201 (Ct. of
Err. & App. 1946).
82. See, e.g., D.B. Clayton & Associates v. McNaughton, 279 Ala. 159, 182 So.2d 890
(1966) (income tax specialists); Weiss v. Levine, 134 N.J. Eq. 1, 34 A.2d 237 (Ch. 1943)
(orthodontists); Hayes v. Altman, 424 Pa. 23, 225 A.2d 670 (1967) (optometrists); Worrie v.
Boze, 191 Va. 916, 62 S.E.2d 876 (1951) (dance teachers).
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decision to invalidate lawyer restrictive covenants by noting the
need for clients to be able to select the lawyer of their choice. 3
However, the previous New Jersey decisions that applied the "rea-
sonableness" test did not discuss the need for people to have unlim-
ited freedom to use the doctors, engineers, or other professionals of
their choice. 4 To date, it appears that New Jersey courts have held
that clients have the unlimited right to select the attorney of their
choice but do not have a similar right to select a doctor or engineer. 5
One possible explanation for the different treatment of lawyer
restrictive covenants may be that unlike those of other professional
organizations, 8 the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility can be
interpreted to oppose any agreement that restricts the right of a
lawyer to practice law.8 However, the ABA Code does not expressly
support the notion that the client possesses an unlimited right to
choose counsel.8 8
The Dwyer court rejected the restrictive covenant on ethical
grounds and thus protected the rights of the 159 clients. Previous
New Jersey decisions, as well as those of other jurisdictions, have
83. 133 N.J. Super. at 347, 336 A.2d at 500.
84. See, e.g., Irvington Varnish & Insulator Co. v. Van Norde, 138 N.J. Eq. 99, 46 A.2d
201 (Ct. Err. & App. 1946); Marvel v. Jonah, 83 N.J. Eq. 295, 90 A. 1004 (Ct. Err. & App.
1914).
85. However, the most recent case before Dwyer in New Jersey involving professionals was
Irvington Varnish & Insulator Co. v. Van Norde, 138 N.J. Eq. 99, 46 A.2d 201 (Ct. Err. &
App. 1946) which involved an engineer's restrictive covenant. It is conceivable that as a result
of Dwyer, New Jersey will hear new cases involving professionals' restrictive covenants and
may decide them on the reasoning of Dwyer rather than on the reasoning of Irvington Varnish
& Insulator Co..
86. The American Medical Association (AMA), for example, does not have a disciplinary
code that includes a provision similar to ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY D.R. 2-
108(A). See AMA PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS (1957). In fact, the AMA tried to form
employment restrictive covenants with physicians and hospitals in Washington, D.C. to
prevent them from dealing with the patients and physicians of a non-AMA approved health
care association. These covenants were found to be unreasonable and illegal. AMA v. United
States, 317 U.S. 519 (1943).
87. See 133 N.J. Super. at 347, 336 A.2d at 500.
88. According to the ABA code, a lawyer "is under no obligation to act as advisor or
advocate for every person who may wish to become his client .... " but "shall not lightly
decline proffered employment." ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY E.C. 2-26. Besides
relying upon the ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, the Dwyer court cited Marshall
v. Romano, 10 N.J. Misc. 113, 114, 158 A. 751, 752 (C.P. Essex County 1932) which held that
a client is always entitled to be represented by counsel of his own choosing. 133 N.J. Super.
at 347, 336 A.2d at 500. In contrast, the AMA codes say expressly that "a physician may
choose whom he will serve." AMA PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS § 5 (1957).
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enforced covenants which prohibited employment over a wider
geographic area89 or for a longer period of time" than the covenant
in Dwyer. Such enforced covenants appear to be less ethical than
the Dwyer covenant as they compelled employees to relocate their
business activities and deprived a potentially greater number of
people of their services.'
The major flaw in the reasoning of the Dwyer decision is the
court's failure to recognize that the common law "reasonableness"
test encompasses Dwyer's "ethical" standards. The "ethicality"
test inquires whether a covenant would result in any hardship to
present and potential clients9" and, to a lesser extent, whether hard-
ship would be incurred by the employee or partner bound by the
covenant." However, a restrictive covenant is judged "reasonable"
when it simply "protects the legitimate interests of the employer,
imposes no undue hardship on the employee and is not injurious to
the public."94 In effect, the two standards used in the "ethicality"
test are included in the "reasonableness" test. The "reasonable-
ness" test has the advantage over the "ethicality" test of weighing
the interests of the employer with those of the employee and the
public. The "ethicality" test does not consider the legitimate right
of the employer to protect himself from unfair competion.
While Dwyer purported to use ethical considerations to judge
restrictive covenants, the court's adherence to a broad interpreta-
tion of Disciplinary Rule 2-108(A) precluded it from determining
whether the actual covenant it was judging was ethical. The Dwyer
court did not examine whether the covenant was injurious to any of
89. Due to the varying natures of different businesses, it is difficult to compare restrictive
covenants in determining the relative severity of each. Blake 648. However, this author is
judging the severity of restrictive covenants by whether they force an employee to either
relocate his business activity or change his mode of employment. In Dwyer, the partners were
not forced by the covenant to relocate their practices nor to stop practicing law. The restric-
tion in the covenant upheld in Weiss v. Levine, 134 N.J. Eq. 1, 34 A.2d 237 (Ch. 1943) covered
a seven-county area and the covenant upheld in Irvington Varnish & Insulator Co. v. Van
Norde, 138 N.J. Eq. 99, 46 A.2d 201 (Ct. Err. & App. 1946) covered the entire United States.
90. A covenant restricting the employee for ten years was enforced in Nachamkis v.
Goldsmith, 10 N.J.L. 356, 128 A. 238 (Ct. Err. & App. 1925).
91. For example, a covenant that covers the entire United States would deprive the entire
country of that person's services and force the employee to either enter a new line of business
or move to another country in order to continue doing the same work he had done in the past.
92. See 133 N.J. Super. at 347-49, 336 A.2d at 500-01.
93. See id.
94. Solari Indus., Inc. v. Malady, 55 N.J. 571, 576, 264 A.2d 53, 56 (1970).
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the partners or whether anybody, including the 159 insurance car-
rier clients, suffered or will actually suffer hardship because of an
inability to retain any of the partners due to the covenant. Instead
of actually applying the "ethicality" test, the Dwyer court assumed
that clients are always injured by limitations on their right to select
an attorney and that as a result lawyer restrictive covenants could
never be ethical. That conclusion ignores the positive aspects of
these covenants. Often, young attorneys accept employment con-
tracts from law firms with restrictive covenants in order to gain legal
experience." Law firms may be less willing to give potential young
competitors a chance to gain experience and to establish personal
contacts with clients if they were prohibited from protecting their
established interests."
Dwyer's blanket rejection of all lawyer restrictive covenants may
also have the effect of discouraging partnerships between willing
attorneys involving willing clients. It is possible, for example, that
the partner in Dwyer who was assigned the 154 carrier clients en-
tered the partnership with those clients and did not want to lose
them in the event the partnership dissolved. It is equally possible
that such a partner would not have entered into the partnership
agreement without a restrictive covenant to protect his established
interests. 7
The Dwyer court does not posit any persuasive reasons why law-
yers should be treated any differently from other professionals and
businessmen"8 and why the "reasonableness" test should not apply
to lawyers. If New Jersey courts are intent upon establishing an
unlimited right of clients to choose their servants, all restrictive
covenants should be prohibited rather than simply those involving
lawyers. Doctors, other professionals, and businessmen should take
note that future courts of New Jersey and other jurisdictions may
turn from the "reasonableness" test to either an "ethicality" test or




98. See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 95 S. Ct. 2004, 2012-13 (1975). In Goldfarb, the
Supreme Court rejected the ABA's argument that lawyers should be treated differently from
businessmen in the application of the Sherman Act to the Virginia State Bar's price-fixing
scheme. Id.
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a prohibition of all restrictive covenants, particularly those involv-
ing professionals."
Robert L. Schonfeld
99. But see id.. By holding lawyer price-fixing schemes illegal, the Supreme Court in
Goldfarb was encouraging the development of active competition among lawyers. Unlike the
Dwyer court which was opposed to active competition and restrictive covenants, the Supreme
Court might consider lawyer restrictive covenants as being necessary and legitimate tools to
use against unfair competition in a system that would permit active competition among
lawyers.

